On the design of invoicing practices in international trade by Viaene, J.M.A. (Jean-Marie) & Vries, C.G. (Casper) de
Open economies review 3:133--142, 1992. 
9 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
On the Design of Invoicing Practices 
in International Trade 
JEAN-MARIE VIAENE 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
CASPER G. DE VRIES 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium 
Key words: invoicing, sequential bargaining, Grassman's law 
Abstract 
We advance an explanation for the choice of the invoice currency of international trade 
contracts on the basis of strategic bargaining considerations. The choice of the invoice 
currency originates in a situation in which each trader takes into account the other 
party's bargaining power. The latter depends on the individual discount factor, whether 
one is the first or second proposer, and whether one is on the short or long side of the 
market. Along these lines we explain the Grassman bias for trade contracts to be 
invoiced in the exporter's currency. 
Apart from the price, the currency of invoice and the forward rate are 
both major factors influencing the volume of international trade. The 
forward market as a means of hedging against currency risks has 
received due attention in the literature (Ethier 1973). However, the 
choice of the invoice currency has received much less attention. The 
only empirical law relating to the choice of currencies in foreign trade is 
Grassman's law, according to which foreign trade is mainly invoiced in 
the exporter's currency (Grassman 1973; see Bilson 1983 for a macro- 
economic explanation). This law has been revisited by several authors 
(e.g. Black 1985). Deviations from this law are also well recorded 
(Basevi et al. 1985). In this paper we advance explanations for the 
choice of the invoice currency on the basis of strategic bargaining 
considerations. It allows for a wider spectrum of behavior than is indi- 
cated by Grassman's law, but at the same time places restrictions on 
the data which are falsifiable. 
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Specifically, we 
decision problem 
model of hedging 
conditional on the 
main result of this 
break down the hedge and currency of invoice 
into two parts. The first part formulates a simple 
behavior for an exporter and a foreign importer, 
degree of invoicing in the exporter's currency. The 
part is to demonstrate how under specific conditions 
each party has an incentive to invoice in its own currency. The second 
part of the paper presents two models that describe the invoicing 
equilibria that can arise under different bargaining processes. If bar- 
gaining occurs sequentially, the exporter has more than half of his 
export revenue invoiced in the domestic currency if he is able to make 
the first offer. This advantage diminishes the smaller the time interval 
between offers and the less the discounting of the outcome of the 
bargaining. If the traders are matched randomly, and who gets to make 
the first offer is determined randomly as well, the exporters' currency is 
the dominant currency of invoice if the importers outnumber the ex- 
porters, since this conveys some monopoly power to the exporters. 
1.  The  hedge dec is ion  
This section describes the hedge decision given a particular invoice 
practice ~.. Consider a domestic exporter and a foreign importer who 
have agreed to trade one unit of a certain indivisible commodity bundle. 1 
The exporter charges price p for his product in the home currency, 
whereas he charges p, in the foreign currency. The domestic currency 
is assumed to be the exporter's preferred monetary habitat. For this 
reason his profits are expressed in the domestic currency. The one 
period ahead profit function [-[ of the exporter reads: 
F[ = ~,p 4- (1 - -  ;( ,)Up. - -  c 4- (f - -  @)H, (1) 
where @ is the random one period ahead domestic price of foreign 
currency, f is the forward rate, H is the net supply of forward currency, 
and c is the per unit production cost in the domestic currency. Due to 
trade credit, the exporter is to receive ~.p 4- (1 -- ~.)@p, one period 
ahead. Part of the receipts are in the home currency and the other part 
in the foreign currency, as is indicated by the invoice parameter 4. To 
shield himself against the uncertain future spot rate, the merchant can 
take a hedge H by buying or selling foreign currency forward. 
Assume that the first two conditional moments of @ exist such that 
E[@] ---- ~ and Var[~] --- 02. Assume further that the exporter maximizes 
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a mean variance utility function with constant absolute risk aversion 
parameter a :2 
a 
max: EU = E[ ] ' I ] -  - -  Var[I~]. (2) 
H 2 
The optimizing hedge is: 
H = [f -- E]/a~ 2 + (1 -- ~.)p,. (3) 
The resultant expected utility level reads: 
1 [f _ ~]21ea 2_ c + ~.p + (1 - ,~)fp,. (4) EU = ~-  
Note that the merchant in general only hedges part of his exposure. 
With a zero risk premium, i.e. f = E, the exporter hedges completely. 
Even without any foreign currency risk, i.e. ~. = 1, the risk averse 
merchant still takes a small part of a favorable bet: H = (f -- E ) /ea  2 
(cf. Arrow 1976, p. 100). 
Now consider the case that the invoice parameter is not exogenously 
given but can be determined by the exporter. In order to determine ,&, 
view the expected utility in equation (4) as a function in 2~. Differentia- 
tion gives: 
~)EU 
- -  - -  p - -  fp . .  (5 )  
Because EU is linear in p, EU increases (decreases) with ~. as p > 
fp, (<) .  The relevant domain of ~ is restricted to the interval [0, 1], 
because ~ refers to the proportion of exports invoiced in the domestic 
currency. Three solutions may prevail. First, if p = fp,, then any 0 ~< 
~< 1 generates the same expected utility, and the choice of the 
invoice currency is not relevant. Second, if p > fp,, then ~)EU/~)). > 0 
on [0, 1], and expected utility attains its maximum at the corner solu- 
tion )~ -- 1. Third, if p < fp,, then ~)EU/a,;{. < 0 on [0, 1], and expected 
utility attains its maximum at 2~ -- 0. We restrict ourselves to the cases 
p < fp, or p > fp,, when ~ ---- 0 or 1, and discard the happenstance 
p ---- fp,. Will ,;t ---- 0 or 1 also be the observed outcome? 
In order to answer this question, the preferences of the exporter's 
trade partner come into the picture. Consider a foreign importer who 
retails the imports abroad against price s,. Assume the importer faces 
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the following profit function: 
F [ .=s . -~.  ~p - (1 -2 )p .+ v~ 
1 1 )H., 
v~ f 
(6) 
where the subscript ..... refers to variables denoted in foreign currency. 
The foreign currency is assumed to be the preferred monetary habitat 
of the importer, and hence his profits are expressed in this currency. 
For simplicity, the profit function (6) is in the same spirit as (1), with the 
differences stemming from the fact that the importer buys the commo- 
dities sold by the domestic exporter. Using (2) again one finds the 
optimizing choice of H.: 
H. -- [~. - 1/f]/aa2. + ;tp. (7) 
Hence, 
1 
EU. -- ~- [c. -- 1/f]2/ao2. + s. - (p/f))~ -- p.(1 -- ~), (8) 
where ~. = E[1/v~] and ~2. __ E[1/~/ - ~.]2. Again, viewing EU. as a 
function of ~, differentiating (8) gives: 
~)EU. 
&;t 
- -  = - (p/ f )  + p.. (9) 
Taking the case p > fp., the derivate in (9) is negative and it is 
optimal for the importer to set ~ -- 0, i.e., the importer prefers to pay in 
his own currency. This conflicts with the exporter's preferences and the 
conflict holds for the other case as well. 3 Note that the invoice parame- 
ter is independent of the hedge decision and both parties' preferences 
are monotonic in ~ over the relevant interval. This rules out multiple 
equilibria and indicates that the relevant variable for the rest of the 
analysis is ~ only. Thus the assumption of complete information seems 
appropriate in this setting. How can we resolve this apparent conflict 
over ~? The next section attempts to give an answer. 
2. Sequent ia l  bargaining over the currency of invoice 
Imagine that both parties bargain over the value of invoice parameter 
by alternating bids until an agreement is reached. Depending on the 
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specifics of the commodity being traded we distinguish between two 
cases. The first case presumes the bargaining over ,;(. can be studied 
in isolation from market considerations. Such may be the case in the 
trade of nonstandardized commodities, when there is no outside option. 
However, for trade in standardized commodities, like the grain trade, 
market considerations have to be taken into account, because each 
party can opt out and contact a new partner. 
2.1. No market consideration 
Assume the following bargaining process. Each party, in turn, makes 
an offer in terms of ,;(. and the other party may agree to the offer or 
reject it. If the other party accepts, the game ends; if the offer is 
rejected, a counteroffer is made at the next epoch, and so on, with no 
limit on the number of repetitions of the process. As time is an impor- 
tant factor in international trade, it is assumed that both parties dis- 
count the final agreement by a common factor 0 ~< & ~< 1. The 
discount factor provides some incentive for the players to reach an 
agreement. The game is asymmetric because of the need to determine 
the negotiating order. Rubinstein (1982) showed that a unique solution 
exists which can be supported as a Perfect Equilibrium." Table 1 
presents the equilibrium solutions ~ conditional upon p > f p* and the 
exporter having the advantage of making the first offer. In this equilib- 
rium, the exporter receives ~ = 1/(1 4- &) and the importer receives 
1 --,~ = &(1 4- &); the exporter is better off because more than half 
his export revenues are invoiced in the domestic currency (0 < & < 
1). If the importer is the first proposer, the two outcomes have to be 
interchanged. We have the following result: 
Proposition 1. In the bargaining process over the invoice parameter ~. 
between an exporter and an importer, the first proposer has an advan- 
tage over the second proposer with respect to the determination of the 
invoice currency. This advantage diminishes the smaller the time 
interval between offers and the less the discounting of the outcome of 
the bargaining. For the proof, see Rubinstein (1982) or Sutton (1986). 
In view of the above, this suggests that the bias toward the exporter's 
currency is related to the exporter being the first proposer. The latter 
conclusion constitutes a falsifiable proposition, but leaves unanswered 
why the exporter is predominantly the first proposer. Some special 
cases occur whenever the time between an offer and a counteroffer is 
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Table 1. The invoice parameter 
1- - ,~ 
1 6 
0<6<1 1+6 1+6 
1 1 
6~1 - -  - -  
2 2 
6~0 I 0 
I I 
t~O - -  - -  
2 2 
small, or when the two parties do not discount the final outcome. In 
these cases the equilibrium is at ,~ ---- { and the exporter's advantage 
vanishes. The extreme case 6 --" 1 seems to be appropriate for 
the trade in capital goods and nonstandardized commodities, as all 
aspects of the deal need to be investigated and parties exhibit patience. 
In case parties heavily discount the outcome, 6 ~ 0, then the first 
proposer wins, as the deal would have evaporated by the time the 
counteroffer is made. The fact that in some commodity markets the 
invoice currency is determined by custom (mostly trade in primary 
commodities) reflects the general impatience of agents on these mar- 
kets. In these latter cases, however, market considerations can be 
important. For example, the fact that some commodities are well traded 
vis-&-vis other commodities probably reduces a party's discount factor, 
as one can easily switch and deal with another merchant. 
2.2. The disequilibrium model 
In this section, market considerations are introduced, the bargainers are 
matched randomly, and who gets to make the first offer is determined 
at random as well (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1985; Rubinstein 1987). 
The latter can be achieved by introducing a random selection mecha- 
nism (such as who places the phone call in case of the grain trade) to 
determine the first proposer. At each epoch and before the bargaining 
starts, there is a matching stage in which each agent may meet a new 
partner. At each matching stage the probability of an exporter meeting 
an importer is e and the probability of an importer meeting an exporter 
is /7, with 0 < e, /~ ~< 1. If an exporter was in the process of bar- 
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gaining in the previous period and did not reach an agreement with an 
importer, then there are three possible cases in the current period. 
With probability a, the exporter in question abandons his previous 
partner and meets a new one. With probability (1 -- a)/3, the exporter 
is abandoned and does not meet a new partner, but his partner does. 
With probability (1 - a) (1 - /~) ,  both partners continue their bargain- 
ing in this period as well. After a trade is concluded both agents leave 
the market, and are replaced by another importer and exporter. To 
illustrate the significance of the matching probabilities we shall assume 
that the number of importers, m, exceeds the number of exporters, n. 
The probabilities then become a = 1 and /3 ---- n/m. Hence, at each 
moment of time, all exporters are involved in trade and some importers 
cannot be matched to an exporter due to the excess of importers over 
exporters. The matching probabilities remain constant over time if n 
and m remain constant as well. The difference between this and the 
previous setup is that in their bargaining the exporters and importers 
take the probabilities a, /3 into account, and the risk of losing the deal 
creates a pressure on the bargaining parties to reach an agreement. 
We have the following result: 
Proposition 2. If market considerations are taken into account, and if 
the exporter and importer have equal probability to be the first pro- 
poser, then members on the short side of the market receive a more 
favorable invoicing parameter, but their advantage does not enable 
them to appropriate all the unit surplus. This advantage diminishes the 
less the discounting of the bargaining, and increases the smaller the 
time interval between offers. Several cases are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. The invoice parameter with market considerations 
O< a,/3 < I a=1 /3 :1  
( I  - -  6) + 6a  I ( I  - -  6)  + 6a 
0<6<I  
2(1 -- 6) + 6a + 6/3 2 - -  6 + 6/3 2- -  6 + 6a 
a 1 ct 
a+/3  1+/3  l+a  
1 1 1 
6~0 - -  - -  
2 2 2 
a 1 a 
t~0 
a+f l  I+# l+a  
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Proof. (Rubinstein 1987) Denote by ,~ the equilibrium invoice parameter. 
Let V(t) and V,(t) be the expected values for an exporter and an 
importer, respectively, of being in the market before it is known whether 
they are matched. These values are a weighted average of the value 
of being able to bargain now and not being able to bargain during the 
current period: 
V(t) - -  a,~(t) 4- (1 - a )6V( t  4- 1 ), (10) 
V.(t) =/~[1 -- ~(t)] 4- (1 -- ,8)(~V.(t 4- 1). (11) 
In equilibrium, the invoice parameter offered at t 4- 1 by an importer to 
his export partner is valued at time t as &V(t 4- 1). Similarly, the invoice 
parameter offered by an exporter to the importer is valued as [1 - 
~V,(t 4- 1)]. Since the toss of a coin determines the first proposer, we 
have: 
~(t) ----- [1 -- 3V,(t 4- 1)]/2 + 5V(t + 1 )/2. (12) 
The solution ,~(t) to the above three equations then takes the form: 
~(t) = (1 - 6 )  + 6a 
2(1 - 8 )+ &a + ~/~ (13) 
The proposition is of interest because it relates the value of )~ to the 
relative number of exporters to importers, /~ -- n/m. This number is in 
principle an observable quantity. There are some reasons, a priori, to 
believe that n < m. To take the case of the Netherlands, for example, 
there are 7,701 registered exporters and 9,406 importers. Out of the 
total of these two numbers, 21% of the firms are producing manufac- 
turers, with 2,923 engaged in exporting and 723 importing. A much 
larger group comprising 54% of the total do not produce but are just 
engaged in trade. Of this latter group, 2,824 focus exclusively on 
exports, while 6,325 only deal in imports, s Given that production of 
manufacturers is concentrated in firms, while consumption is spread 
over a much larger number of households, one expects that there are 
many more distributors and hence importers than producing firms and 
exporters. This gives the exporter a bargaining advantage over the 
importer, as the exporter has a better chance of finding another partner 
in case the deal is off. Thus our analysis shows that Grassman's law is 
possibly a manifestation of the asymmetry in bargaining power between 
importers and exporters. To broaden the scope of this concTusion, a 
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case in which both the currency of invoice and the price are negot iable 
is of potential  interest for future research. 6 
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Notes 
1. This analysis can be extended to incorporate the quantity decision as well, but is 
omitted for considerations of space; cf. Ethier (1973). 
2. For the results (see equations (5) and (10)), it is immaterial whether agents have 
different attitudes toward risk, provided they are all risk averse, or have diverse 
precisions; cf. Stein (1985). To streamline the presentation we assume identical 
behavior. 
3. tn the case that there are no forward markets, i.e., H = H, = 0, it is immediate 
that the merchants unambiguously prefer to invoice in their own currency. 
4. An intuitive proof and discussion is provided in Sutton (1986). 
5. Data Source: NV Databank Adressen Catalogus, NV Databank, Woerden, 1987. 
6. The collinearity between the two instruments necessitates analysis which is out- 
side the scope of this paper. 
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